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The Origins of Multiracialism.
David Everatt.
Introduction.
Resistance politics in the 1950s was dominated by the Congress Alliance,
made up of the African National Congress [ANC], the South African Indian
Congress [SAIC], the Coloured People•s Congress [CPC] and the white
South African Congress of Democrats [SACOD]. The Alliance mobilised
people of all races against apartheid in a manner previously unseen in
South African history. The internal politics of the resistance movement,
however, was dominated by wide-ranging and bitter disputes over the form
that racial co-operation should take. That dispute centred on the
multiracial nature of the Congress Alliance - that is, an alliance of
separate Congresses comprising members of a single ethnic group, co-
ordinated at regional and national levels.
Multiracialism afforded each Congress equal representation on all co-
ordinating structures. As a result, SACOD, with an average membership
of 250, was equally represented on Alliance structures with the ANC,
which had an average paid-up membership of between 30 000 and 50 000.1
Multiracialism stood in marked contrast with the nonracialism of
organisations such as the disbanded Communist Party of South Africa
[CPSA], the South African Communist Party [SACP] and the Liberal Party,
which contained members of all ethnic groups within a single
organisation.
Multiracialism generated a wide range of criticism. At the centre of
such criticism lay SACOD, "the white wing of the Congress Alliance."2
SACOD was a small, militant white organisation which supported extra-
parliamentary campaigns in pursuit of equal rights, and which included
a number of former CPSA members. SACOD1s place in the Alliance provided
a focus for a wide range of organisations which regarded SACOD as a
•communist front1 and multiracialisin as the means by which communist
influence was being entrenched in the Alliance. Liberals and Trotskyists
in Cape Town stated:
COD is a boss organisation in an alliance of racial organisations
and is a great believer in the big stick. The organisations
allied to it are boy organisations. COD dictates its instructions
to them. They never meet as equals: theirs is simply to obey...3
In essence, multiracialism was seen as a mechanism of control engineered
by white communists following the disbanding of the CPSA in 1950, who
were unable to gain individual membership of the black Congresses.
Existing explanations of the emergence of multiracialism stress its
strategic content: that is, the fact that it acknowledged the differing
material conditions affecting ethnic groups which had been politically
and geographically divided under both segregation and apartheid. As
leading SACOD member Helen Joseph recently put it.
The feeling . .. was that it was important for work to be done
amongst the different groups of people who whether we like it
or not are separate - the bloody Group Areas [saw] to that. It
corrals us in separate areas so that we are living apart from
each other and we can't deny it.4
The ideological content of multiracialism has been ignored. This paper
explores the ideological roots of multiracialism, and argues that they
lie in large part in the hostility which characterised relations between
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the CPSA and the ANC Youth League [ANCYL].
Both the CPSA and ANCYL called for the radicalisation of the ANC and
the development of a mass base as the only means to a successful
national revolution. However, the CPSA Central Committee [CC] warned
that nationalism obscured class oppression, and called for the
transformation of existing organisations "into a revolutionary party
of workers, peasants, intellectuals and petty bourgeois"; that single
organisation would co-operate with the CPSA in opposing racial
discrimination and "develop[ing] class consciousness in the people."5
The ANCYL brought to the ANC a strident (and at times exclusive) African
nationalism and a strong anti-communism. Youth Leaguers strongly
resisted nonracialism, which they saw as a CPSA-inspired attempt to by-
pass existing national organisations and create a permanent "unity
movement" emphasising class above national consciousness. In contrast,
the League insisted that racial co-operation "can only take place
between Africans as a single unit and other Non-European groups as
separate units."7
Leading Communist Party member Brian Bunting, speaking of the
distinction between the CPSA's nonracialism and the ANCYL1s
multiracial ism, stated: "let us not be confused by semantics. "8 The
distinction, however, was more than semantic. The hostility between the
ANCYL and the CPSA resulted in the strategic debate over nonracialism
or multiracialism being imbued with heavily ideological overtones.
This paper analyses the dispute between the CPSA and the ANCYL in order
to locate the ideological roots of multiracialism. In so doing, tensions
within the CPSA over the relationship between class and national
struggle are discussed. Those tensions grew in the late 1940s as a
result (in part) of CPSA/ANCYL hostility. As one Party member put it:
[in] the late 40s you'll find that the Party got itself into a
bit of a bind. On the one hand there was the classic class
communist analysis. On the other hand there were people ... who
were terribly sensitive to the national liberation struggle ...
So these two things had to be reconciled.9
The Communist Party and the African National Congress.
The ANC in the 1940s and early 1950s was transformed from a small
organisation concerned to enroll "distinguished university graduates,"10
to a mass-based nationalist organisation pursuing national liberation
by extra-parliamentary means including stay-aways and passive
resistance. Those changes were largely brought about by the ANC Youth
League, formed in 1944 and comprising a group of highly able students
of law, medicine, and teaching; non-professionals such as former miner
and bakery worker Walter Sisulu were important but rare.
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Congress politics in the late 1940s was dominated by the ANCYL as it
set itself the twin tasks of "impart[ing] to Congress a truly national
character," and opposing those who sought to provide "foreign leadership
of Africa."11 Youth Leaguers stressed "the need for vigilance against
Communists and other groups which foster non-African interests."1 In
practice the ANCYL programme entailed gaining control of Congress, while
isolating organisations and individuals who exerted influence over the
ANC, or sought to develop their own African support base outside the
ANC.
The transformation of the ANC took place in the years following the
second world war. Influenced by the liberal ethos of the war years, the
ANC concentrated on drawing up and popularising Africans' Claims in
South Africa, a major statement of principle which attempted to
delineate the ideological path that should be followed by a government
which appeared to be backing away from segregation. In so doing, the ANC
continued the constitutional petitioning of the pre-war years. Grass-
roots organisation around civic issues was left to other organisations.
Black trade unions grew, while squatter movements and bus boycotts
represented a spontaneous popular response to the hardships faced by the
black population.
In contrast with the wartime ANC, the Communist Party was directly
involved in grass-roots organisation in some townships, most notably
on the East Rand. As Hilary Sapire has demonstrated in the case of
Brakpan location, the CPSA mobilised residents around immediate local
concerns such as wages, employment practices, the extension of passes
to women, the shortage of housing and pass law raids. The CPSA contested
Advisory Board elections and used the Boards and Vigilance Associations
as means of establishing "footholds in location communities."13 Through
the work of CPSA members such as David Bopape and Gideon Ngake in using
such elected positions as platforms to defend local interests, the CPSA
in Brakpan instituted itself as "the undisputed political force in the
region." The CPSA also ran night-schools in the major centres which,
according to the Johannesburg District Party secretary, were "a very big
factor in the development of the membership of the Party." Elsewhere
in the country the CPSA successfully contested Advisory Board elections,
winning all six seats in East London in 1942, as well as local council
seats in Cape Town, East London and Johannesburg.
The CPSA, with organisations such as the Springbok Legion and Friends
of the Soviet Union, successfully mobilised large sectors of the white
population.16 CPSA members were active in the burgeoning black trade
union movement, while Hilda Watts won a seat on the Johannesburg City
Council in the whites-only Hillbrow ward. As a result of its high
political profile and success in various spheres of operation, some
elements within the CPSA began to think of the Party in terms of a
potential mass movement.
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By the end of the war, the CPSA had emerged as a significant force in
black organisation. However, it remained CPSA policy to work with the
ANC and build it up. In 1929 the CPSA had accepted a Comintern directive
which stressed the need to work within "the embryonic organisations
among the natives, such as the African National Congress11 so as to
transform the latter into a "fighting nationalist revolutionary
organisation against the white bourgeoisie and British imperialists."
This remained Party policy despite being affected by the internal
ructions of the CPSA in the 1930s, and the anti-fascist 'Popular Front1
strategy of the 1940s.
The national organisations, according to the CPSA, were to spearhead a
revolution aimed at abolishing racial discrimination and attaining equal
rights for all. Thereafter, the struggle for socialism could take place.
Nonetheless, in 1940 the ANC was a small, weak organisation of the black
elite. As the CPSA complained:
The year 1940 has arrived with hardships and misery for the
oppressed and poor peoples of the Union of South Africa . ..
Unfortunately the year finds the forces of freedom as scattered
as sheep in the presence of wolves. When talking of the forces
of freedom, one cannot lose sight of the fact that the African
people are potentially the most important of these forces.
Therefore, if the Africans do not pull themselves together to
face the enemies of freedom vigorously, not only will they let
themselves down, but they will let their allies down also. 9
Black Party members were reluctant to join the ANC. As CPSA Johannesburg
District secretary Rusty Bernstein recently noted, some black members
"wouldn't join it. They thought the ANC was rather reformist bourgeois
nonsense - 'that's not for us, we're revolutionaries!1"20
While the CPSA extended its township base during the war years, it
remained concerned with the state of the ANC on which it focussed much
critical attention. Party members such as David Bopape, J.B.Marks, Edwin
Mofutsanyana and Moses Kotane were also ANC members. CPSA literature
emphasised that national liberation struggles "fought in the colonial
and semi-colonial territories" were "no mere side issue," but rather an
integral part of a global anti-imperialist struggle.21 By the end of the
war, signs of change were visible within the ANC. The increasingly
prominent Youth League had begun to criticise the moderation of the ANC,
and its failure to establish a branch structure and win a mass
following.
During the war years black trade unions grew apace and strike action
increased markedly over the 1930s. Black militancy increased as black
urbanisation and proletarianisation was met with an acute housing
shortage, soaring prices and, after 1943, the harsh implementation of
influx control. The ANC however failed to capitalise on these
conditions. As a result, rival organisations aimed at mobilising black
opinion were formed or revitalised.
As Karis has noted, Africans impatient with the ANC for its moderation
and failure to develop a mass base "had various courses of action open
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to them in 1943."22 The Youth League was formed within the ANC,
comprising young urban intellectuals who rejected traditional ANC
constitutional protest in favour of mass mobilisation and extra-
parliamentary action. Outside the ANC, the African Democratic Party
[ADP] was formed, while the All-African Convention [AAC] agitated for
a 'non-collaborationist' strategy.
The CPSA accepted that the ANC, the largest of the three, remained "the
premier political organisation," both because of historical ties and
possibly affected by the fact that both the ADP and the AAC were
influenced, in differing degrees, by Trotskyist thinking. As a result,
CPSA statements in the 1942-1948 period insisted that black communists
had a responsibility to work within the ANC and SAIC; the Johannesburg
District passed a resolution declaring it "to be the duty of all
Communists belonging to oppressed nationalities to join their respective
national movements, so as to work for the strengthening of such
movements."24 As we have seen, such resolutions were made necessary
through the reluctance of some black CPSA members to join the ANC. As
Rivonia trialist Elias Motsoaledi recently stated:
[the] Party taught me the struggle. I attended ANC meetings but
was not happy with it at the time [the late 1940s]. To me, the
ANC did not interpret the aspirations of the masses. But the
Party taught me that it was my responsibility to tell the ANC
about our aspirations ... at the time, the ANC was dominated by
sophisticated intellectuals who only spoke in English.
CPSA literature and internal reports during the war reflect three
related themes in discussing the ANC and the broader national liberation
movement. In the first place, the CPSA acknowledged the progress made
by ANC President-General Alfred Xuma in reorganising the ANC, but
criticised the Congress for failing to provide political leadership in
a period which witnessed black industrial organisation and urban
militancy. In a 1943 report on National Movements of the Non-Europeans,
the CPSA Executive Committee noted that "the lack of a strong and
influential organisation among the Non-Europeans, has been felt time and
time again" and criticised the ANC for failing "in its main task - that
of uniting its membership and carrying out the formation of branches in
a systematic manner."26 In 1945 the CPSA Johannesburg District called for
a "practical plan of campaign and action" to channel popular militancy.27
Flowing from this, a second theme of CPSA commentary on national
movements was to consistently call for the elaboration of a minimum
shared programme between national organisations, the CPSA and the trade
union movement. Such a programme, it was argued, would allow for both
ideological and organisational unity. The third theme comprised repeated
calls for the development of a united front of all organisations
opposing racial discrimination. The CPSA argued that "[a]11 genuine
movements towards national liberation are progressive," but warned
against the tendency to racial exclusiveness which would obscure the
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underlying reality of the class oppression of all workers. The CPSA
supported the emergence of a "broad fighting alliance"29 or "wide
democratic front"30 which would oppose segregation while underplaying
exclusive nationalism.
The postwar programme of the CPSA was internal ly contested, as some
members called on the Party to capitalise on its wartime successes and
concentrate on class struggle in place of its commitment to a 'two-
stage1 revolution.31 In part, this flowed from the changing nature of the
ANC, as the ANCYL grew increasingly prominent. CPSA members and reports
expressed concern that
the realities of the class divisions are being obscured ...
Nationalism need not be synonymous with racialism, but it can
avoid being so only if it recognises the class alignments that
cut across the racial divisions.32
The ANCYL voiced criticisms of the ANC similar to those of the CPSA,
calling for the development of a branch structure and mass membership,
and the utilisation of extra-parliamentary means of opposition. At the
same time, however, the late 1940s saw the spreading influence of the
Youth League and its twin hostilities: - towards the CPSA, and towards
anything other than "occasional cooperation" with other racial groups.33
The ANC Youth League.
The ANC began to show signs of change following the formation of the
Youth League in 1944. The ANCYL Manifesto, issued in March 1944, noted
criticism of the ANC as "a body of gentlemen with clean hands" which had
failed to organise the mass of the African population.34 The ANCYL was
formed as "a protest against the lack of discipline and the absence of
a clearly-defined goal in the movement as a whole" and was committed to
"rousing popular political consciousness and fighting oppression and
reaction." More significantly, it stressed that "the national liberation
of the Africans will be achieved by Africans themselves. We reject
foreign leadership of Africa." The ANCYL programme was based on an
interpretation of African nationalism which rejected non-African
leadership and "the wholesale importation of foreign ideologies," while
emphasising African pride and self-sufficiency.35
The ANCYL was influenced in part by the growth of anti-colonial
movements in the postwar period. Anton Lembede, a lawyer and leading
Youth League ideologue, noted that
the history of modern times is the history of nationalism ...
All over the world nationalism is rising in revolt against
foreign domination, conquest and oppression in India, in
Indonesia, in Egypt, in Persia and several other countries. Among
Africans also clear signs of national awakening, national
renaissance, or rebirth are noticeable...36
The ANCYL saw its "immediate task" as the need "to overhaul the
machinery of the A.N.C. from within," remoulding the ANC into a mass-
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based organisation pursuing national liberation and mobilising support
by means of a militant African nationalism. The ANCYL stressed "the
divine destiny of the African people"38 and the need for "high ethical
standards" to "combat moral disintegration among Africans."
One aim of the ANCYL - as of the CPSA - was to radicalise the ANC. For
the Youth League this entailed the provision of nationalist leaders who
rejected constitutionalism in favour of mass-based extra-parliamentary
action. Part of that task was seen to be the removal of non-African
nationalists from influencing Congress. Lembede, the League's first
President, argued:
No foreigner can ever be a true and genuine leader of the African
people because no foreigner can ever truly and genuinely
interpret the African spirit which is unique and peculiar to
Africans only. Some foreigners Asiatic or European who pose as
African leaders must be categorically denounced and rejected.40
In calling for the development of African nationalism as a mobilising
force sufficient to challenge the status quo, the Youth League came to
see both liberalism and communism as competing ideologies.41 In attaining
its objectives - providing a radical African nationalist leadership
intent on developing a mass base - the ANCYL came to see the CPSA as a
competitor.
The ANCYL and the CPSA 1944-1949.
The conflict between the ANCYL and the CPSA between 1944 and 1951, and
its resolution in the 1952 - 1955 period, has been widely discussed.42
That discussion has nonetheless remained within the bounds set by Youth
Leaguers themselves, who stressed that Africans in South Africa suffered
national, and not class oppression, and therefore rejected CPSA analysis
as spurious. The ANCYL opposed 'Vendors of Foreign Method1 who
seek to impose on our struggle cut-and-dried formulae, which so
far from clarifying the issues of our struggle, only serve to
obscure the fact that we are oppressed not as a class, but as a
people, as a Nation.
However, a closer analysis of Youth League antipathy towards the CPSA
is required in order to elucidate the precise nature of the conflict
between the two organisations, and the ramifications of that conflict.
Such an analysis questions the acceptance of the ANCYL simply as an
expression of anti-communism or exclusive nationalism (or both), and
sheds light on the internal politics of the resistance movements in the
1940s and 1950s.
The conflict between the ANCYL and CPSA operated on two main levels.
On the one hand, the ANCYL reacted strongly to the Communist Party's
repeated calls for a broad nonracial alliance of organisations opposed
to segregation. The broad front proposed by the CPSA was to "conduct
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mass struggles against race discrimination" while underplaying exclusive
nationalism by "develop[ing] class consciousness in the people" and
"forg[ing] unity in action between the oppressed peoples and between
them and the European working class."44 The ANCYL rejected the class
content of nonracialism as proposed by the CPSA. Rather, the League
insisted that "the national liberation of Africans will be achieved by
Africans themselves"45; co-operation between the oppressed groups was
acceptable only when the racial groups were organised in "separate
units."46
On the other hand, both organisations were seeking to influence the
development and direction of the ANC at a time of growing black
militancy. As will be seen, the programmes of the two organisations
were in many respects not dissimilar. As a result, the conflict appears
to have mixed ideological disputation with elements of a power struggle.
That conflict moreover worked itself out over a particular issue: the
form that racial co-operation should take.
The programmes of the Youth League and the Communist Party had many
points of similarity. The ANCYL, in insisting on the national basis of
black oppression in South Africa, argued that black South Africans
"suffer national oppression in common with thousands and millions of
oppressed Colonial peoples in other parts of the world."47 Moreover,
Lembede argued: "After national freedom, then socialism."48 In this he
was joined by Ashby Mda, a lawyer and leading Youth Leaguer, who argued
that the interests of the mass of Africans could be protected only by
"the establishment of a true democracy and a just social order." By
1951 Mda defined 'a just social order1 in terms of "full political
control by the workers, peasants and intellectuals" combined with "the
liquidation of capitalism" and "equal distribution of wealth.1'50 While
the ANCYL as a whole did not explicitly endorse socialism, Lembede
argued that "Africans are naturally socialistic as illustrated in their
social practices and customs," and concluded that "the achievement of
national freedom will therefore herald or usher in a new era, the era
of African socialism."51
In essence, nothing in the above programme conflicted with the CPSA's
understanding of the South African situation. Strategically, both called
for the radicalisation of the ANC leadership and the development of an
ANC branch structure and mass base as necessary preconditions for a
successful national revolution. Ideologically, the CPSA had accepted the
primacy of the national question following adoption of a 1928 Comintern
thesis which placed South Africa within the ambit of fcolonial and semi-
colonial countries.f The 1928 thesis endorsed
an independent native South African republic as a stage towards
a workers1 and peasants1 republic, with full equal rights for all
races, black, coloured and white.52
The vision of a socialist revolution taking place in phases meant that
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the CPSA programme largely tallied with Lembede's vision of national
revolution followed by (African) socialism. Finally, the CPSA accepted
the premier position of the ANC in the national liberation struggle.
The ANCYL, with a belief "in the unity of all Africans from the
Mediterranean Sea in the North to the Indian and Atlantic Oceans in the
South," saw the struggle for equal rights as part of a pan-African anti-
colonial movement.53 For the CPSA, the notion that black South Africans
were colonially oppressed was at least implicit in the 1928 thesis. The
idea of internal colonialism was hinted at but not developed by CPSA
member Eddie Roux in 1928:
we have a white bourgeoisie and a white aristocracy of labour
living in the same country together with an exploited colonial
peasantry. Here the participation of the workers of the ruling
class in the exploitation of the colonial workers is very
apparent ... the exploitation occurs within the confines of a
single country.54
Caught up in the factionalism of the 1928-1935 period, and thereafter
in the Popular Front politics of the anti-fascist period, internal
colonialism and its implications were not assessed by the CPSA until
the period under study.
The Politics of Nonracialism.
The above discussion should not imply that there were no differences
between the ANCYL and the CPSA. Rather, it should serve to focus
analysis on the precise location and nature of the ANCYL/CPSA conflict.
The CPSA switch from opposition to active participation in the second
world war following the invasion of the Soviet Union had generated
widespread hostility. The CPSA expended much energy during the war in
popularising the Soviet Union and was seen by the ANCYL to have an
agenda which stretched beyond national liberation and was informed by
a 'foreign ideology1 using "methods and tactics which might have
succeeded in other countries, like Europe."
The issue on which Youth League suspicion of the CPSA came to focus
most directly was the question of nonracialism. The CPSA was concerned
to avoid the emergence of a racially exclusive African nationalism which
would obscure and retard class struggle. As we have seen, the Communist
Party stressed the need for the liberation struggle to be waged by a
broad front of organisations led not by the black bourgeoisie but by
"the class-conscious workers and peasants of the national group
concerned" so as to foster class-conscious racial unity.56 While both the
ANCYL and the CPSA called for the development of the ANC, the latter
supported the emergence of a broad front of organisations (including the
ANC) representing Africans, Indians, Coloureds and trade unions.57 In co-
operation with such an alliance, the CPSA could
carry out its task of exploring the class purposes of race
oppression, creating a working class consciousness, breaking
down national prejudices and providing leadership in the struggle
for socialism.58
As Lodge has noted, j oint CPSA/ANC members on the whole enjoyed the
support of more conservative and established members of the ANC national
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executive.59 Both rejected the Youth League call for a complete electoral
boycott, while the more pragmatic ANC leaders supported broad unity in
opposition to racial discrimination. Black unity increased markedly in
the late 1940s. In 1947 Doctors Xuma, Naicker and Dadoo, representing
the ANC, Natal Indian Congress [NIC] and Transvaal Indian Congress [TIC]
respectively, signed the 'Doctors Pact1 which accepted "the urgency of
co-operation between the non-European peoples and other democratic
forces for the attainment of basic human rights..." In 1946 the NIC
began to mobilise support for a passive resistance campaign against the
•Ghetto Act1 which lasted for two years and saw over 2000 resisters of
all races (predominantly Indian) imprisoned. Rallies and public meetings
began to be held under the joint auspices of the African and Indian
Congresses, as well as the (Coloured) African People's Organisation
[APO].
The Youth League position on racial co-operation was complicated by the
presence of both an exclusive approach which rejected such co-
operation, and a more inclusive approach. The leadership of the League,
however, was drawn increasingly from the latter category, comprising men
who accepted greater racial co-operation while laying stress on the
centrality of a strong African nationalist organisation. In 1946 Anton
Lembede stated that co-operation between Africans, Indians and Coloureds
"can only take place between Africans as a single unit and other Non-
European groups as separate units."61 The ANCYL thus endorsed the 1947
Pact, stating in its Basic Policy: "The National Organisations of the
Africans, Indians and Coloureds may co-operate on common issues."62
The CPSA had endorsed a similar position in 1943, calling for separate
organisations representing Africans, Indians and Coloureds, co-
ordinated at regional and national levels.63 with the rise of the Youth
League and the spreading influence of its nationalist programme,
however, the CPSA increasingly supported the idea of one mass
organisation which would co-operate with the Party. At the end of the
decade, the CPSA called for the transformation of the existing separate
national organisations
into a revolutionary party of workers, peasants, intellectuals
and petty bourgeoisie, linked together in a firm organisation
... guided by a definite programme of struggle against all forms
of racial discrimination in alliance with the class-conscious
European workers and intellectuals.64
The language of the report was imprecise and unclear. For the Youth
League, however, it implied the creation of a single nonracial
organisation and served to cement their rejection of the CPSA approach
as the 'importation' of methods and tactics which originated in
conditions prevailing in Europe. As a result, the question of racial co-
operation - that is, the form that racial co-operation should take -
became an issue of contention between the Youth League and the Communist
Party.
The nature of this conflict became apparent in the CPSA/ANCYL dispute
59
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over the 1948 People's Assembly for Votes for All. In 1948 the Transvaal
branches of the ANC, CPSA, APO and TIC proposed the calling of a
nonracial People's Assembly as a means of highlighting the franchise
issue on the eve of the general election. However, the Assembly soon
became caught up within the ANCYL/CPSA conflict. Youth Leaguers on the
ANC Transvaal Executive declared themselves willing to participate in
the Assembly only if the organising committee was restricted to
representatives of the ANC, TIC and APO - in other words, accepting co-
operation between national organisations but not with the CPSA.
As a result of Youth League agitation, the ANC refused to officially
participate in the Assembly. Transvaal ANC President C.S.Ramohanoe later
faced a motion of no confidence for issuing a statement in support of
the Assembly. The point at issue was not mere anti-communism. Rather,
as law student Nelson Mandela of the Transvaal ANC Executive (and a
leading Youth League member) made clear in a report carried by The
Guardian,
the Working Committee of the People's Assembly had invited the
African National Congress to send delegates to the Assembly. The
A.N.C. Executive was not in opposition to the general aims of the
People's Assembly, but felt that it was being summoned in an
incorrect manner, in that the established national organisations
were being by-passed ... The organisers of the People's Assembly
had departed from agreed methods, and there were suspicions
that a permanent "unity movement" was being formed.
The 1948 clash between the ANCYL and CPSA is important in two respects.
The Assembly dispute highlighted the way in which ideological
differences were being fought out over the issue of nonracialism - not
simply because of Youth League exclusivity or racism, but because moves
towards nonracialism were seen to be part of an ideology which stressed
class above race, and would retard the emergence of a strong African
National Congress.
Both anti-communism and exclusive nationalism existed in the ANCYL. The
League however was led by men such as Oliver Tambo, Walter Sisulu and
Nelson Mandela, who emerged as leaders of the Congress Alliance in the
1950s. Their position in some degree parallelled that of CPSA member
James La Guma who first proposed national democratic struggle as the
initial phase of a socialist revolution in the 1920s. From different
perspectives, both stressed the fact that, as the Simons put it with
reference to La Guma,
equality could be achieved only when Africans were powerful
enough to win respect from the whites.
Secondly, the dispute reflected the changing fortunes of the ANCYL and
the CPSA. In the late 1940s, the influence of the Youth League spread
within the ANC, while that of the CPSA diminished. The League had
initially set itself a three to five year programme to change Congress 7,
but over the next four years the ANC made few moves towards developing
a mass base or radicalising its methods of opposition. At the same time,
the squatter movement was organised by Mpanza into the Sofasonke party
and contested Advisory Board elections, the ADP gained representation
on the Native Representative Council with the election of Paul Mosaka,
and the CPSA extended its township base. In 1948, in far more assertive
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terms, the League claimed that the ANC required "drastic and
revolutionary changes," which it was to bring about:
From the very outset, the Congress Youth League set itself, inter
alia, the historic task of imparting dynamic substance and matter
to the organisational forra of the A.N.C. This took the form of
a forth right exposition of the National Liberatory outlook -
African Nationalism - which the Youth League seeks to impose on
the Mother Body.68
In a private letter, 1948 ANCYL President Mda acknowledged that a clash
between the ANC and the Youth League was "inevitable" because "the
Congress Senior leadership reflects the dying order of pseudo-
liberalism and conservatism, of appeasement and compromises."69
The Rise of the Youth League.
In order to successfully implement its programme, the Youth League had
to transform the ANC. To achieve this, it had to gain a position from
which it could determine Congress policy. In the first instance this
entailed building up its own ranks, and branches were established in
Durban, Cape Town and at Fort Hare (although the majority of Youth
Leaguers remained in the Transvaal). At the same time, League members
moved into ANC provincial structures. Secondly, as we have seen, it
entailed combatting the competing ideologies which sought to influence
the development of the ANC. In the first place, the Youth League turned
on white liberals such as the Ballingers, Edgar Brookes and members of
the Institute of Race Relations who had influence over certain leading
Congress personalities. Hostility towards the liberals was exacerbated
by the 1946 dispute over the NRC adjournment and the League's call for
the boycott of all 'Native Representation1 elections. The weaning of
Congress from the influence of white liberals was largely completed by
1947.
Finally, if the Youth League were to direct a militant movement for
national liberation under the aegis of the ANC, competing organisations
had to be isolated. The AAC remained a small, Cape-based organisation
increasingly dominated by the Non-European Unity Movement to which it
had affiliated, while the ADP had begun to collapse by 1947. Both the
AAC and ADP were accused of causing Mrift[s] on the national unity front
at this critical moment" which would have the effect of "invit[ing] more
oppression for Africans."70 In essence, all those who sought to mobilise
Africans in support of organisations other than the ANC, or ideologies
other than African nationalism, were attacked. This included the CPSA,
which had largely set the pace in township organisation in the 1940s,
and which stated:
Our first task is to continue building the Party, to strengthen
it so that we can play a decisive part in shaping the future of
South Africa. We must draw in thousands of members of each racial
and national group, provide them with a Socialist education, and
organise them for work among their own people...
ANCYL power and influence within the ANC grew markedly in the late
1940s. For much of the period, older ANC leaders revealed a preparedness
to work with Communists. The League failed in 1945 and 1947 to have all
CPSA members removed from Congress, and were outvoted by CPSA and
conservative ANC members on their call for an electoral boycott.72
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Nonetheless, Leaguers occupied increasingly important positions within
the provincial structures of the ANC, and by 1948 were sufficiently
entrenched to stop ANC participation in the People's Assembly.
By 1949, the League was powerful enough to insist that endorsement of
the Programme of Action should be a precondition for election to the
post of President-General of the ANC. At the 1949 ANC Annual Conference,
the League succeeded in ousting Xuma from the post and securing the
election of Dr. James Moroka, while six ANCYL members were elected to the
National Executive Committee (Sisulu as Secretary-General), Two years
later. Leaguers were able to remove A.W.G.Champion as ANC President in
Natal, securing in his place the election of Albert Lutuli, later
elected President-General of the ANC.
While the Youth League grew in importance and influence within the ANC,
the fortunes of the CPSA declined markedly. Following the 1946 African
miners strike, the CPSA Executive Committee was tried for sedition, in
a case which lasted from 1946 to 1948. White support for the CPSA,
visible during the war, disappeared as the Cold War gathered force, and
organisations such as the Springbok Legion, Friends of the Soviet Union
and the Left Book Club either shrank or disappeared. The Trades and
Labour Council was divided as the Nationalist Party made a concerted bid
for white working class support. The attacks on the CPSA by both the UP
and NP governments culminated in the Suppression of Communism Act of
1950 which outlawed the CPSA and any doctrine 'which aims at bringing
about any political, industrial, social or economic change within the
Union.'
Finally, the rise of the ANCYL threatened to remove CPSA influence
within the ANC. This was clearly of central importance in view of the
CPSA commitment to a ' two-stage' revolution. As we have seen, the
dispute between the CPSA and the League comprised a number of
interrelated factors. Central to the dispute was the growing stress
placed on class struggle by the CPSA in reaction to the apparent rise
of an anti-communist petty-bourgeoisie in the shape of the Youth League.
Moreover, on the critical issue of the Party's approach to the national
question and relations with national organisations, differences appear
to have existed within the CPSA.
The CPSA and National Democratic Struggle. 1947-1950.
Few documents are available relating to the internal workings of the
CPSA in its final years, or to the activities and debates of the
underground SACP during the 1950s. The ensuing discussion is made up
from those documents which do exist, the j ournals attached to the
discussion groups of the early 1950s, and interviews with leading
CPSA/SACP members. •-
The CPSA in the late 1940s revealed differing approaches to the national
question and the national movements in South Africa. According to Rusty
Bernstein, "political tendencies had developed which began to separate
to some extent." Crudely put, the differences revolved around the
emphasis laid on the place of class struggle in relation to the national
struggle waged by the Congresses. As Bernstein put it, "it related to
the significance to be attached to the national liberation movement."73
Differences moreover revealed themselves (allowing for generalisation)
in largely regional terms, with the Party in the Cape differing from the
Transvaal and Natal regions.
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The headquarters of the CPSA had been moved from the Transvaal to Cape
Town following the internal vicissitudes of the 1930s. Cape members
dominated both the Executive and Central Committees. Throughout the late
1940s, the Transvaal without success exerted pressure for Party
headquarters to be returned to Johannesburg, arguing that the centre of
political developments was located in their region. More pertinently,
Party members in the Transvaal and Natal (and some in the Cape) argued
that the Cape leadership revealed an approach to the national
organisations that was grounded in "traditional concepts of Communist
Party activity" and did not "adequately understand the national
movement.l|75
The differing emphases placed on class and national struggle by the
Cape CPSA appear to have resulted from a number of factors. Firstly,
the Cape Town branch of the ANC was small and weak in contrast with
similar centres elsewhere. This was in part the result of demographic
factors, Cape Town being the only centre where Africans were a minority,
in addition to which migrant labourers made up a large part of the
African population. As the Cape District Secretary Fred Carneson put it,
the majority of the population were coloureds . .. they were
articulate, they had been well organised for years, they were
used to participating in trade unions and the whole atmosphere
was different in the Cape. So certainly, Johannesburg and Durban
and PE, we were each operating in a different political
ambience.76
The Cape Town branch of the ANC was led by Thomas Ngwenya, who later
worked closely with the Liberal Party. Leading Congress and Youth League
personalities were concentrated in the Transvaal and, to a lesser
extent, Natal. As a result, the CPSA in Cape Town worked with a small
ANC, and an even smaller Youth League.
The major political battles of the late 1940s were largely fought out
within the Transvaal ANC, where Youth Leaguers clashed with ANC/CPSA
members over a series of initiatives including the People's Assembly. 7
Leading Transvaal CPSA members such as Marks, Bopape, Mofutsanyana,
Tloome, Dadoo and others worked within the Congress movement and
supported moves to radicalise the Congresses. Communist Party politics
in the Transvaal was to a large extent bound up with Congress politics,
as Party members rejected the strand of exclusive nationalism within the
ANCYL while supporting the militancy it injected into the ANC. Black
Party members involved in Congress politics emerged as leading CPSA
personalities in the Transvaal and Natal.
In contrast, the dominant personalities in the Cape CPSA were white.
As Ben Turok put it, compared with the Cape, Johannesburg
was a different world. In Cape Town the whites were the strongest
personalities, around The Guardian - you could on two hands pick
out a good number of intellectuals, very experienced political
cadres - Simons, Bunting, Carneson, Ray Alexander, a whole group
of them. Whereas the African group was small, inexperienced, and
much less senior.78
The Cape-based CPSA Executive Committee, as well as the CC, were
predominantly white, which added fuel to Youth League attacks on
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'foreign' bearers of non-African ideologies.
To some extent, the dominance of whites in the Cape arose from the
political activities undertaken by the Party in Cape Town, which
differed from those of Communists elsewhere. As Fred Carneson put it,
"we had to tailor our approach, it had to be completely different in
the different areas, and so it was."80 Cape Town was the headquarters
of The Guardian, a leftwing newspaper which focussed on the struggle
against racial discrimination and carried news of the Congresses largely
ignored by mainstream newspapers. Its foreign news was consistently pro-
Soviet and anti-American. In the late 1940s The Guardian was edited by
CC member Brian Bunting, and its editorial board comprised many leading
Party personalities in the Cape. A large number of CPSA members worked
for The Guardian as j ournal ists and in sell ing the newspaper. The
Guardian was in itself a major focus of activity - as Turok put it, "you
... joined The Guardian when you joined the movement ... you joined The
Guardian and its circle."81
Lacking a strong Congress presence, the focus of CPSA activity in the
Cape was divided between The Guardian and trade union work in which Ray
Alexander, James Phillips and others had been involved for many years.
A third distinguishing feature of Cape activity was continued and
successful participation in parliamentary and provincial council
elections. The wartime electoral successes of the CPSA had disappeared
elsewhere; in the Cape the CPSA continued to win seats on the city
council, and in 1948 won the Cape Western Native Representative and
Provincial Council seats.
The political milieux in which Cape Communist Party members moved was
in many ways different from elsewhere. Debates in the nonracial Forum
Club, the Africa Club, and in organisations such as the Modern Youth
Society, centred on class struggle and hostilities between Communists
and Trotskyists.82 The major ideological conflict faced by the CPSA in
Cape Town was not with national ist Youth Leaguers, but with the
Trotskyist Non-European Unity Movement, the major political influence
among coloured intellectuals. NEUM intellectuals such as Benny Kies and
Kenny Jordaan produced a sustained critique of national struggle and its
supporters (including the CPSA) for having "as its objective the triumph
of capitalist democracy."83
Some CPSA members in the Cape expressed similar opinions regarding the
limitations and dangers of nationalism. Fred Carneson noted that
it was not only the communists that did not see things, at that
stage, as a struggle for national liberation. Africans themselves
did not see it as clearly as they see it now.84
CC member Jack Simons stated in 1954 that "the history of nationalism,
whether of the progressive or imperialistic kind, is intimately bound
up with the history of capitalism . . . and the rise of bourgeois
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democracy."85 He continued:
Communism is not necessarily the antithesis to Nationalism. It
is the antithesis to Capitalism. But it must be remembered that
the rise of capitalism is closely associated with Nationalism.
Simons argued that "nationalism is progressive in so far as it is aimed
at the removal of discrimination and the achievement of democracy"; at
the same time, however, nationalism "can be exploited by an aggressive
movement directed towards the suppression of another group or nation."
A similar viewpoint was strongly evident in the 1950 CPSA CC report,
which stressed that
South Africa is entering a period of bitter national conflict
... On all sides the national and racial divisions are being
emphasised and the realities of the class divisions are being
obscured.
In such a situation, the Report argued, "nationalism need not be
synonymous with racialism, but it can avoid being so only if it
recognises the class alignments that cut across the racial divisions."
The need to emphasise class struggle was heightened by the accession to
power of Youth Leaguers within the ANC, and the anti-communist agitation
of Selope Thema and other ANC members. In response, the CPSA called on
its members to "make a practice of issuing immediate and critical
comment on the statements of the bourgeois leaders" and disallow "the
bourgeois elements in the national movements" from attacking "the
working class movement . . . the Party or ... adopt[ing] a negative or
hostile attitude to the international working class forces."
In contrast, the CPSA in Johannesburg debated with those to its right
rather than its left, and engaged with African nationalists. As we have
seen, many leading members of the Party were simultaneously ANC or SAIC
members. Where CPSA members in Cape Town emphasised the primacy of class
struggle, in the Transvaal and Natal Party members in the Congress
movement fought to prove the Party's commitment to national struggle.
The Transvaal, and in particular Johannesburg, was the centre of
political developments in South Africa. This was reflected in CPSA
activity in the region. The squatter movements, bus boycotts and the
1946 African miners strike (and their resultant politicising effects)
had all been located in the Transvaal. The Transvaal ANC was the largest
and most radical ANC branch in the country. As we have seen, the
Johannesburg CPSA urged black Party members to join the Congress
movement, while leading Party members were at the forefront of moves
to radicalise the Congresses. CC member Yusuf Dadoo was a leading figure
in the SAIC which he led into alliance with the ANC. The ANC in the
Transvaal was led by men such as J.B.Marks and David Bopape, joint
ANC/CPSA members.
Bopape, as we have seen, succeeded in making Brakpan location the
political centre of the East Rand, and establishing the CPSA as the
dominant force in its politics; however, he was at the same time
Transvaal ANC Secretary and a member of the Youth League. The
organisational skills of J.B.Marks were demonstrated in the 1946 miners
strike (Marks was President of the African Mine Workers Union) and were
largely credited with the successful stay-away on May Day 1950, which
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resulted in his election as Transvaal ANC President. As we have seen,
conservative ANC members frequently co-operated with CPSA members in
opposition to Youth League radicalism; joint ANC/CPSA members worked
closely with Transvaal ANC President C.S.Ramohanoe, who supported the
calling of the People's Assembly for Votes for All. Ramohanoe expressed
little or no support for the ideological battle waged by the ANCYL
against the CPSA, characterising Leaguers as "armchair politicians who
keep on going from place to place preaching Congress and doing
nothing."9*
The Transvaal ANC, however, was also the political home of leading Youth
League members such as Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu, and Oliver Tambo.
As a result, the conflict between the Youth League and the CPSA was to
a large extent fought out in the Transvaal. The late 1940s were a period
of political ferment within the Congress movement, which saw the ANC
grow in size and militancy and seek alliances with Indian and Coloured
organisations. In this ferment, according to Rusty Bernstein, Transvaal
Communists sensitive to the Congress movement
began to adjust the Party's view of the significance of the
national liberation movement. It placed the national liberation
movement much more in the forefront than it had done.9
This was made easier at the end of the decade as leading members of the
Youth League began to show signs of changing their former hostility
towards both racial co-operation and the Communist Party.
The resolution of the ANCYL/CPSA conflict.
In the early 1950s, the Youth League began to divide into two camps;
one remained strictly Africanist, while the other supported racial co-
operation in the form of the Congress Alliance. In the same period the
conceptual language of leading Youth Leaguers came to resemble that of
the CPSA, particularly the language of anti-imperialism. By 1953 Nelson
Mandela spoke freely of the ANC "uncompromisingly resist[ing] the
efforts of imperialist America and her satellites to draw the world into
the rule of violence and brute force," and condemned "the criminal
attacks of the imperialists against the people of Malaya, Vietnam,
Indonesia and Tunisia."92 As Mandela, Tambo, Sisulu and others moved into
senior positions within the ANC (Mandela was co-opted to the ANC NEC in
1950), leadership of the Youth League passed to a younger generation of
Fort Hare intellectuals, of whom Z.K.Matthews1 son Joe Matthews was the
most prominent.
As Walshe has shown, by 1951 Matthews was clearly linking the South
African struggle to a broader international struggle against the
"indirect enemy," the United States. According to Matthews, Africans
were exploited under capitalism in "the final stage of monopoly capital
gone mad, namely fascism." Support for socialist countries amongst some
Youth Leaguers grew because of the clear opposition to racism and
support for decolonisation which distinguished them from the western
countries. Joe Matthews stated:
I must say I am pretty fed up with the U.S.A., their stand is
rotten and the Eastern nations have beaten the West on the colour
issue ... I ... think America has lost African friendship. As far
as I am concerned I will henceforth look East where race
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discrimination is so taboo that it is made a crime by the state.
At the same time, leading Youth Leaguers supported extra-parliamentary
and industrial action. With Mda, Bopape and others, Matthews argued that
the "labour power of the African people" was the key to success in the
struggle.95
The relationship between CPSA and Youth League members in the late 1940s
and early 1950s was clearly more dynamic than earlier in the decade, as
both organisations underwent significant changes. During this period
some sections of the Communist Party adjusted their understanding of and
relations with the national organisations as those organisations became
increasingly prominent and active. At the same time, the Youth League
was itself changing, and ANCYL members such as Mandela, Matthews, Sisulu
and others increasingly utilised the tools of Marxist analysis.
As we have seen, some CPSA members argued that the ANC had emerged as
an anti-communist petty-bourgeois nationalist organisation, aimed at
the maintenance of capitalist relations in a nonracial society.96 As
such, it was argued, there existed the danger of a rapprochement between
the ANC and the 'progressive industrialists1 which had emerged during
the second world war. Joe Matthews rejected the argument, asserting that
"the possibility of a liberal capitalist democracy in South Africa is
exactly nil" because the "political immorality, cowardice and
vacillation of the so-called progressives . . . render them utterly
useless as a force against fascism."97 Mda went further: the removal of
legally enforced discrimination
might under certain circumstances very well mean that the African
middle class joined hands with the European, Indian and Coloured
middle class in order to impose further chains and to exploit the
black peasants and toiling millions ... It has happened before
in many Colonial territories even in Africa. It must not happen
here.
More significantly, Youth League members who had taken up positions
within the ANC began to accept the strategic need for alliances. The
passing of laws which discriminated against the entire black population,
such as the Population Registration Act, the Group Areas Act, and in
particular the implications for all resistance movements in the
Suppression of Communism Act, led to a reassessment by Leaguers of the
need for a broad alliance of anti-apartheid forces. The reassessment
included some of the most virulently anti-communist League members. For
example, Jordan Ngubane, editor of Inkundla ya Bantu, castigated the
CPSA in 1950 for "stampeding our people into the May Day demonstrations"
in which 18 Africans were shot by the police. Nonetheless, Ngubane
argued, while "Communism and apartheid are two similarly vicious evils"
the most dangerous of those at the moment is apartheid. The
African Nationalists will do well to exercise a little more
statesmanship and realise that they can carry their fight against
the Communists only up to a certain point if they are not going
to play right into the hands of [Prime Minister] Malan ... it is
more important to exercise statesmanship in our dealings with the
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Communists than to help the Malanites by weakening their
political enemies."
Attempts to build the existing ANC/SAIC alliance to include trade unions
and Coloureds threatened by disenfranchisement failed. Following the
1950 May Day murders, and facing the imminent enactment of the
Suppression of Communism Bill, June 26th was declared a Day of Protest
and a stay-away was called. This followed consultation with the SAIC,
the CPSA and the APO. The aim of ANC and SAIC leaders was to create a
Co-Ordinating Committee of Congresses and trade unions, but in the event
the CPSA disbanded while the APO and trade unions sent only moral
support. By June 26 1950, the alliance remained limited to the ANC and
SAIC.
By the end of 1950, Youth Leaguers were in control of the ANC, which
was committed to a programme of extra-parliamentary action. In 1951
plans were laid for the Defiance Campaign, which transformed the ANC
into a mass movement. The CPSA disbanded in June 1950, and individual
black communists worked increasingly within the ANC. By 1952, debates
taking place amongst former CPSA members across the country highlighted
the growing emphasis amongst communists on national liberation struggle.
The power struggle which it has been argued partly characterised
ANCYL/CPSA relations in the 194 0s had been settled in the Youth League's
favour.
Existing explanations of the resolution of the CPSA/ANCYL conflict
stress the diminution of hostility following the election of Youth
Leaguers to the ANC National Executive Committee, where "their personal
experiences of close co-operation" with communists resulted in their
"anti-communist tendencies ... [being] modified."100 It is suggested here
that such explanations are partial; although undoubtedly significant,
the context in which CPSA/ANCYL hostility diminished was one of
ideological shifts on both sides and the entrenchment of the ANCYL
within the ANC hierarchy.
Class and race in South Africa: The CPSA in 1950.
The relationship between the ANCYL and the CPSA at the end of the 1940s,
it has been argued, was dynamic. Youth Leaguers made increasing use of
Marxist analysis and shared anti-imperialist attitudes with Communists.
Once in control of the ANC, they included the CPSA in their search for
allies. In response, sections of opinion within the CPSA began to adjust
the Party's understanding of and approach to national struggle. In doing
so, regional differences within the CPSA again became visible.
Despite changes within the ANC and the Youth League, the CPSA in the
Cape maintained what one member described as "a long tradition of
suspicion of the ANC" as a bourgeois, anti-communist organisation.101
This was a perception by no means restricted to the Party in the Cape,
or shared by all Cape Party members.
Former CPSA Johannesburg District chairperson Danie du Plessis argued
that the ANC should be assessed not in terms of its constituent
membership, but its leadership. The latter represented an "incipient"
black bourgeoisie which aimed "to integrate themselves into the existing
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local capitalism rather than to oust the oppressors. "102 The ANC
leadership, du Plessis argued, were "bourgeois or bourgeois agents" who,
at a point of crisis, "would join forces with the government against the
workers, and would first protect their own interests."103
Nonetheless, the characterisation of the ANC as a reformist bourgeois
organisation was strongly identified with the Cape CPSA. According to
some former Party members, the Party in the Cape placed a lesser
emphasis on national liberation struggle than elsewhere. Bernstein
recently stated:
In Cape Town, where the national movement was really not
significant [as in the Transvaal] the same emphasis did not exist
and there began to be an emphasis on the Party as the leading
element in the whole struggle and the national liberation
movement to be somewhat insignificant. So this political
difference began to show itself.
In contrast with the Cape, sections of the Transvaal CPSA began to argue
that black South Africans suffered both capitalist and colonial
oppression, and that the growing national movement was a natural
response to colonialism. Eddie Roux, who had hinted at this in 1928,
stated in 1952:
I do not agree that South Africa is a capitalist country. I think
one may say that here we have an imperial and colonial
relationship coexisting in the same country. The African people
cannot only be considered to be the subjects of proletarian
exploitation as in other countries; they are subjected to an
extra exploitation because of their colour, something which is
not usually found in other countries with laissez-faire.105
Over the next two years, leading members of the new SACP developed the
theory of 'Colonialism of a Special Type1 [CST].
The significance of CST for the present discussion lies in the approach
to national struggle implicit in the theory. Those who emphasised class
struggle argued that the "businessmen, financiers, landlords" and others
in the ANC leadership would always "place their vested interests first",
characterising them as a 'traitor class.'106 In contrast, Bernstein, CC
member Michael Harmel and others argued that apartheid, in oppressing
all blacks equally, had successfully stunted the growth of an indigenous
black bourgeoisie. As a result, the 'traitor class' was not to be found
amongst blacks - rather, "the traitor class in South Africa is the
European bourgeoisie."107
The adumbrators of internal colonialism argued that the Congress
Alliance, and the ANC itself, represented "an alliance of the working
class and the petty-bourgeois strata of the colonially oppressed peoples
of South Africa." Within that alliance, the working class represented
"the most energetic, whole-hearted and thoroughgoing section of the
fighters for bourgeois democracy, for national liberation."108 Moreover,
it was argued, precisely because of the colonial oppression of blacks
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and the lack of a significant black bourgeoisie, the working class
predominated in Congress membership and increasingly in leadership
positions. Pointing to the adoption of extra-parliamentary strategies
by the Congresses, Harmel argued that "[i]n recent years, the militant
working class tendency has wielded increasing influence in our national
movements." As a result, "the policy of genuine workers1 leaders" should
not be "to drive out the allied classes, but rather to broaden out the
109
movements."
In the postwar years, black CPSA members began to emphasise black
demands such as abolition of the pass laws above the traditional CPSA
concern with the white working class.110 The latter, according to Fred
Carneson, derived from "the fact that your most active section amongst
the working class was either your white workers or your coloured
workers."111 The change in direction for the CPSA was supported by
Harmel, Bernstein and others, who castigated
the pedantic arm-chair socialist types of "theoreticians" who
are apparently unable to see that on practically every main issue
of home and foreign policy, the outlook and aims of such
bourgeois elements as, for example, Dr.Moroka, are far more
progressive in content than such working class elements as the
Mineworkers Union, the S.A.R. Staff Association or the S.A.T.L.C.
[Trades and Labour Council]112
Transvaal communists argued that while colonial oppression blurred class
oppression, it also ensured that the national movements were
overwhelmingly working class in composition.
According to Harmel, changes in ANC policy and strategy - brought about
in part by the ANCYL - were evidence of growing working class influence.
As the struggle intensified and working class influence became even
stronger, Harmel argued, so the national movements would move away from
formulating political demands and concentrate on economic issues.
Moreover, because of internal colonialism, such demands would not
represent the interests of the bourgeoisie; rather, they would highlight
the economic content of national liberation. For Harmel, this included
land redistribution and "the nationalisation of the principal means of
production (for the power of imperialism in this country can only be
broken by divorcing the imperialists from the means of production)."113
The Transvaal Communists who put forward the notion of internal
colonialism concluded that the role of communists was to work with the
national movements for the attainment of national liberation. This would
lead to "the clearing away of the race versus class issue," thus
highlighting class oppression and leaving it "exposed for all to see."114
In brief, differences existed within the CPSA in the late 1940s as to
the nature of the ANC (especially as the Youth League grew in
significance) , and thus over the role of the Communist Party viz a viz
the national liberation struggle. In the event, the tensions were not
resolved before the CPSA dissolved in June 1950; it was only when
members of the new SACP began to elaborate internal colonialism that a
balance between the two began to emerge.
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The 1950 Central Committee Report - the last it issued - revealed the
tensions within the CPSA. The Report tentatively put forward the notion
of internal colonialism, arguing that South Africa exhibited "the
characteristics of both an imperialist state and colony within a single
indivisible, geographical, political and economic entity." The black
bourgeoisie, which could be expected to lead the national struggle, was
small, fragmentary, pinned down in the poorest areas, forced to
use subterfuge and illegalities to evade discriminating laws,
starved of capital, and exposed to constant insecurity. It is not
a class that could provide effective, militant leadership.
Transvaal Communists argued that this meant that the ANC "is not
dominated by the unstable and potentially treacherous elements which
have led similar movements elsewhere," and that Communists should
therefore work in and with the national organisations.115 The 1950 CC
Report, in contrast, argued that the black Congresses were vague,
contradictory and revealed a "tremendous capacity for evasiveness and
ambiguity."116
In essence (and allowing for generalisation), the 1950 Report attempted
to weld together the colonial analysis of the Transvaal with the class
bias of the Cape. The Report concluded that while nationalism need not
be racist, the only way it could avoid being so was through the
transformation of existing national organisations into a single party
of "workers, peasants, intellectuals and petty bourgeois ... in alliance
with the class-conscious European workers and intellectuals."117 The aim
of such a party, which would work in co-operation with the CPSA, would
be to strive for national liberation. However, it would have to be led
by "the class-conscious workers and peasants of the national group
concerned" so as to "develop class consciousness in the people, and to
forge unity in action between the oppressed peoples and between them and
the European working class."
In contrast, Transvaal Communists acknowledged the class content which
was attached to nonracialism and against which the Youth League reacted.
Rusty Bernstein claimed that while "[t]here is no doubt scope for an
organisation representing all races," it was "only possible under a
philosophy of socialism." In present circumstances, he argued,
It is difficult to believe that the national liberatory struggle
can be waged by any organisation other than that representing the
people who are nationally oppressed.118
The CPSA was a heterogenous organisation participating in a variety of
forms of struggle including parliamentary elections, black trade
unionism and Congress politics. Throughout the 1940s the CPSA called
for the emergence of a militant mass-based national organisation to
prosecute the first stage of the 'two-stage' revolution. However, when
the ANC began to grow in size and militancy, it was largely at the
instigation of the Youth League, which endorsed a strident African
nationalism and hostility towards the Communist Party. The CPSA was
divided in its response.
One section of opinion within the CPSA, strongly associated with the
Cape-based Party leadership, called for a greater emphasis on class
struggle, arguing that the rise of African and Afrikaner nationalism
was, in the words of Jack Simons, "camouflag[ing] the Universal
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Exploitation of All Workers, whatever their race." In response to
Youth League insistence on multiracialism, the supporters of class
struggle called for one Congress for all, claiming: "Real and absolute
unity between all races can only be achieved in a workers1 struggle.1'120
A second strand of opinion within the CPSA, which assumed leadership
of the SACP after 1953, stressed the working class content of national
liberation in South Africa, and called on socialists to work in close
co-operation with the emerging Congress Alliance. The 1950 CC Report
represented an attempted compromise between the two; it utilised an
analysis of oppression in South Africa developed in the Transvaal, but
reached conclusions which stressed the primacy of class struggle and the
need to under-emphasise nationalism. The Party remained unsuccessful in
attempting to balance the requirements of national and class struggle.
Conclusion.
Multiracialism was commonly seen by many outside the Congress Alliance
(and some within it) to be a mechanism of control engineered by the CPSA
after it disbanded in 1950. In fact, multiracialism represented a clear
setback for those CPSA members who claimed that class struggle was
obscured by nationalism. The strategic aim of multiracialism - that
communities should be organised by activists drawn from their own ethnic
group who best understood local conditions, sensitivities and issues -
was seen by some CPSA members to represent the final victory of
nationalism over class. With the formation of SACOD, whites were called
upon to organise whites. This generated particular hostility from some
white CPSA members who warned that "there is no such thing in social
movements as freedom by the instalment plan" and refused to join
SACOD.121 Far from being the consensual act of white communists concerned
to dominate and direct the Congress Alliance, the formation of SACOD
highlighted tensions which had marked the CPSA in the 194 0s and
occasioned a major split amongst former CPSA members.
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